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Abstract This paper uses project organizational theories
to draw lessons from a historic megaproject, the Ajaokuta
Steel Plant (ASP). Archival reports on the ASP were
explored to identify the unique attributes of the project; the
political wrangling that underplayed its evolution, its
economic significance and organizational impacts. Find-
ings suggest the goals of the ASP project were, and still
are, unambiguous. Failure occurred as socio-political
forces aggravated the project’s complex milestones.
Stakeholders were impatient with pre-project investiga-
tions. During planning, owners ignored opinions that were
contrary to their expectations. While delays lingered,
pressures from the global economy weakened the project’s
motivation to succeed. These combined to turn the
project’s outcomes into a chaotic situation that triggered
dire implications. Despite about 1400% overrun in cost,
the success achieved on the plant was 28% at commission-
ing. Contractors remained on site until eight years after
commissioning. Six key elements of the 482 items in the
ASP project contract were not delivered nearly 40 years
on. A simplistic look at these suggests poor planning is the
main problem. However, planning issues is not entirely
strange in greenfield projects. The paper draws strength
from project organization theories to explain what was
poor about the planning. Socrates’ generic management
theory was used to explain the role of leadership in the
failure of the ASP project. McGregor’s Theory X and
Theory Y explain the significance of stakeholders’
integration in megaprojects. Systems and chaos theories
were used to explain the sensitivity of the ASP project to
uncertainties. Narratives on these combine well to inspire
stakeholders of megaprojects on where and how to seek
courage in making effective plans that can help achieve
success in complex projects. While normative literature
only recognizes project success in a definitive perspective,
this study provides insights from failure as an instrument to
trigger sublime reflections.
Keywords industrial projects, megaprojects, Nigeria,
project organizational theories, steel plant
1 Introduction
Megaprojects evolve as indelible legacies of a people who
dared humongous obstacles – people who were keen to
find solutions to complex problems of a sheer size. The
planning, development, operations and management of
megaprojects run over a period that sometimes spans
hundreds of years. This paper considers it scholarly helpful
to intertwine the histories of a people and megaprojects’
and, draws strength from insightful reflections regarding
how people and projects’ histories interplay. One aspect of
this is to draw useful lessons from the intended purposes
for which such projects evolve and how a typical project
can meet its intended purposes throughout the various
stages of its development and operations. Flyvbjerg (2014)
has summarized such purposes to include providing
solutions to a large-scale need, incentivizing commerce
and industry and providing a platform to showcase strength
and pride. According to Flyvbjerg (2016), it is common
that these purposes are not met. Hence it is vitally
important to draw more sublime lessons from failures of
megaprojects (if at all) than seeking confidence in success
exemplars (if any) – see Love and Smith (2016).
One perspective to understand why megaprojects fail is
to consider megaprojects in the context of the unique
knowledge required to create and drive them. Such
knowledge, like in the example of China’s Three Gorges
Dam project, is a symbol of a people’s capacity to exercise
exclusive competence (Xie and Zilberman, 2014). This is
not essentially common to every case where the ambitions
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to build megaprojects exist. A typical implication of this is
that megaprojects often have different implications for
different people. The manner in which they transform a
population through their sheer landscapes differs from
place to place. According to Flyvbjerg (2014), there are
sublime implications of this in how megaprojects are
viewed through the lenses of politics, technology,
economics and aesthetics. Normative literatures judge
megaprojects along these lines also. Most studies define
success of megaprojects as though success is attained only
if completion is achieved within pre-contract budgets and
schedules, and to imaginary outputs, often speculated even
when the project environment has yet to evolve (De Wit,
1988; Pinto and Slevin, 1988; Chan, 2001; Collins and
Baccarini, 2004; Andersen et al., 2006; Relle and Gilge,
2013). However, success often means different things to
different people, and as such there are more robust
definitions of success which do not oversimplify achieve-
ments by looking at the positive side of history alone
(Markus and Tanis, 2000).
Pinto and Mantel (1990), Boehm (2000) and Shepherd
et al. (2011) demonstrate the powers of positive thinking
and the robust insights that reflections could bring from
perceived failures in project environments. Their views
suggest there is often more to learn from failure than
success. Whereas insights from successful projects are
about what worked so well and how, failed projects often
provide insights about what worked so well or a little or did
not work at all, when problems erupted and why, and how
future experience can make the best of a negative history.
Furthermore, in the case of megaprojects, stakeholders
often regard achievements in their projects as a part of their
proud history. They are able to see beyond normative
debacles such as costs and schedule issues – for example,
see the account of Murray (2003) and Shenhar and Dvir
(2007) on the Sydney Opera House. The view of Boehm
(2000) is such that even when a project is terminated, there
are elements of victories to celebrate from stakeholders’
aspirations not yet fulfilled.
The global rurality of Africa has been defined by
Olatunji and Ajayi (2017) Balfour et al, (2008) and
Ajaokuta Steel Plant (ASP) is one of the foremost
integrated steel plants in Africa. It’s economic and political
significance are staggering: ASP was Nigeria’s planned
ladder to the commity of technological ‘world powers’ of
the 20th century, and a part of Nigeria’s developmental
plan post-independence from Britain. The ASP was
commissioned in 1985, after which the contractor spent
an additional 6 years on site. As will be pointed out in this
paper, ASP’s budget blew-out severely and severally, and
only less than one-third has been completed to date. In
addition, this paper seeks to explain what went so wrong in
the ASP project, and the lessons that could be drawn from
issues encountered in the project which will be helpful in
future projects.
2 The Ajaokuta Steel Plant project
The vision to construct the largest steelmaking plant in
Sub-Sahara Africa started in 1958. Named the Ajaokuta
Steel Plant, ASP was Nigeria’s first steel plant. As an
integrated plant, the ASP was designed to process inputs to
the main steel plant by itself, convert ore and solid metal to
liquid iron and pig iron to liquid steel. In addition, the plant
will solidify liquid steel, reduce large steel blocks to billets
and roll products into finished shapes. ASP project was
further planned and implemented by successive Nigerian
administrations between 1970 and 1985 when it was
commissioned uncompleted.
2.1 The designed capacity
The ASP was designed to produce 2.6 million tonnes of
steel within the first year, half as plates and the others into
structural steel, rods and wires. There was an expectation
to double the production capacity just after initial
operations have commenced (Oyeyinka and Adeloye,
1988; Matusevich, 2003). In addition, ASP was to help
expose Nigeria’s industrial metallurgy and economy to the
in-house manufacturing of capital goods. The ultimate goal
is to serve as Nigeria’s main platform toward becoming an
economic and industrialized global power (Matusevich,
2003).
2.2 The facility
ASP is an 800 hectares blast furnace facility built on a
24000 hectares land, west bank of River Niger. The project
site was not chosen for convenience, rather for political
reasons. Iron ore, found in Udi and Agbaja, is 266 km and
370 km away respectively. Coal, found in Enugu, is 242
km away also. These three locations are within 130 km
radius to each other. Had the plant been situated some-
where between Enugu and Agbaja, the plant and the raw
materials could have been within 50 km apart only. In
addition, Ajaokuta is 250 km from Lagos coastline,
Nigeria’s biggest steel market and the main commercial
seaport Nigeria has had to date. Not only this, it was
difficult significantly for the construction of support
infrastructure for the plant. The plant’s site was undulate
and rocky, and sloped considerably toward River Niger. To
condition the site appropriately, infrastructure works had
included extensive levelling work, a massive stabilization
work to the river bank, construction of flood canals, a river
port and extensive infrastructures for power and water.
These had meant 21 million m3 of earthwork in site
levelling and terracing, 1.7 million m3 of reinforced
concrete, 0.21 million tonnes of structural elements,
0.181 million tonnes of equipment, 60000 tonnes of
refractory bricks and 65 km of standard rail gauge within
the facility (Matusevich, 2003). If these descriptors are
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isolated, Nigeria has not had a considerable reputation in
delivering very large projects with similar extreme
complexity before the ASP (Oyeyinka and Adeloye,
1988).
2.3 The technology and production capacity
The works of Matusevich (2003) and Oyeyinka and
Adeloye (1988) are quite instructive regarding the
technology and designed capacity of the ASP. Information
from their work suggests the plant consists of five
components and uses a simple blast furnace technology
that relies on oxygen supply. The components include an
oven plant of two batteries, each with 49 coke ovens,
designed to blend 0.9 million tonnes of coke per annum.
The sintering plant is the second component. It has two
machine units, designed to process 2.64 million tonnes of
sinter and pellets every year. Third, the blast furnace which
has two units, with a capacity to produce 1.355 million
tonnes of pig iron per annum. The steelmaking plant, the
fourth component of the ASP, consists of two specialized
Linz and Donawitz (LD) converters of 135 tonnes capacity
each, and three units of 4-strand continuous casting
machines. The fifth, steel rolling mills and a complex
incorporating a billet mill, have a yearly capacity to
produce 0.79 million tonnes. Within the steel rolling mill,
there is a medium section and a structural mill with a
capacity to produce 0.56 million tonnes per annum. In
addition, this part has a light section mill and bar mill with
a capacity to produce 0.4 million tonnes, and a wire rod
mill that has a capacity to produce 0.13 million tonnes per
annum. In addition to the main plant, ASP is designed to
have three ancillary units. These are a raw material
preparation unit, designed to process 2.135 million tonnes
of concentrated iron ore, 1.32 million tonnes of coking
coal, about 700 million tonnes of limestone, 250 million
tonnes of dolomite and 85 million tonnes of manganese ore
annually. There is also a plant for processing by-products,
including wastes from coke ovens to produce dehydrated
tar, ammonium sulfate and many more products. The third
ancillary unit is a 110 MW power plant that uses captive
technology.
2.4 The contracts
The initial contract for the construction of the plant was
signed on the 4th of June, 1976 for 1 billion USD (about
0.620 billion Nigerian naira at the time). Commercial
production was scheduled to commence in ‘1980 or shortly
thereafter’ (Matusevich, 2003). However, the cost was
reviewed upward several times before 1985. For example,
by February 1980, the cost had risen to 12.7 billion USD
(about N7 billion at the time), and it was renegotiated and
raised a few times afterward – see Matusevich (2003). In
addition to the construction cost of the plant, construction
of civil works for the plant was awarded for 1.523 billion
USD (about N838 million) in November 1980. Before key
components of the works were abandoned after protracted
delays, the contract was revised to N1.48 billion in 1986
(see Oyeyinka and Adeloye, 1988). At this point in time,
the value of the Nigerian naira has fallen from 0.55 to 1
USD in 1980 to 2.02 to 1 USD in 1986, now hovering
around 400 to 1 USD in 2018.
2.5 The problems
2.5.1 Free…but in the dark
Britain has had a significant influence on Nigeria for the
better half of a century before Lagos, Nigeria’s foremost
commercial capital city, was annexed by Britain in 1861
(see Crowe’s 1942 documentation of the 1885 Berlin
conference). By the middle of the 20th century, the struggle
intensified to stop the British colonial rule towards
obtaining Nigeria’s independence in 1960. The fight was
tough (Ekeh, 1975). Leaders of pressure groups needed to
harmonize their varying viewpoints and raise the positive
energy in the masses who must be convinced of Nigeria’s
true ability to survive as a sovereign nation. Otherwise, to
the masses of the time, Nigeria is better of as perpetual
‘slave’ to Britain (Adebisi, 1989). Then political bias set
in: Among the most prominent political leitmotif at the
time was some unverified claims about Nigeria’s endless
list of mineral riches – crude oil, iron ore, gold, diamond,
copper, bitumen, coal, niobium, zinc, natural gas, tin,
limestone, columbite, water and forest resources as well as
fertile soil (see Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). These
supposed riches have had little or no place in local diction.
People hardly understood their meaning, uses, quality or
quantity and the opportunities that might accrue through
them. Nevertheless, Nigeria’s first conceptual develop-
ment plan was built around them regardless. Some initial
random plans were adopted in 1958, and upon these
political actors initiated several megaprojects almost
simultaneously – a major hydro-electric power plant, oil
exploration, an integrated steel plant, coal exploration,
massive transport infrastructure projects and major agri-
cultural projects (Falola, 2004). For an incipient economy
that has not had a considerable financial reserve and a track
record of project success, these are excessively ambitious.
Intentionally also, Nigerian leaders shut out their long-term
allies, Britain and United States of America, of impact on
the ASP project. Instead, they chose a new ally in the old
Solviet Union, an ally with which Nigeria has had
significant language and cultural barriers (Matusevich,
2003).
2.5.2 ….Alone in the cold
Nigeria’s intention to start as an independent entity among
industrialized nations is a good idea. However, the good
news ended almost at the level of an intention. The
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knowledge base, proven market, technology and the
infrastructure support to drive the projects were non-
existent. It was Nigeria’s first experience of a megaproject
and there were limited exemplars around to learn from. The
political leaders who ideated the project did so much but
very little regarding knowing enough of Nigeria’s mineral
endowments. Other than names, they did not have
appropriate information on either the industrial values,
the commercial quality or quantity of their mineral
deposits, or the implications of exploitation activities on
their people, the environment and economy (see Williams,
1964).
2.5.3 Uncertainties and social cost of development
In addition, Nigeria’s evolving industrialization project
was bedeviled by inadequate data for planning at the time.
The actual population was unknown and projections for
future development were superficial (Barbour, 1972).
Second, skilled labor was in acute shortage also (Williams,
1964; Oyeyinka and Adeloye, 1988). Moreover, economic
implications of speculations around urbanization and
actual growth were underestimated. As the proposed
industrialization became the most important focus of the
nation, other sectors of the economy such as agriculture
lost their popularity (Matusevich, 2003).
2.5.4 Impatience and political costs
Oyeyinka and Adeloye (1988) outlined the life of a steel
plant into four elements: The gestation, pre-investment,
construction and plant operations. For greenfield plants,
gestation is usually a period of 15 – 20 years prior to pre-
investment and construction. It involves an intensive
planning that requires exploring information and making
provisions for resource inputs and varying production
system scenarios. The success of a megaproject depends
largely on these (Flyvbjerg, 2016). However, between
1958 and 1971 when ASP project commenced officially,
planning efforts were brief and insignificant. They were
conducted by political players and their lackeys (Matuse-
vich, 2003). Within these years, political power changed
hands a few times, back and forth from a democratic
system of government to military rule. There was also a
three-year-long civil war, which claimed the lives of
several million people within this period (Jorre, 1972).
2.5.5 Alternative priorities
By the time the project commenced, Nigeria’s second
national development plan has been promulgated. Areas
affected by the civil war attracted significant resources for
reconstruction, reconciliation and reintegration. Amidst
dwindled resources, competing ends multiplied and grew
more intense. However, regime after regime kept faith in
the ASP project regardless of whatever political diff-
erences they have had.
Being positive in thought did not change the shape and
gravity of the main challenges that evolved in the course of
implementing the project – other than being positive, key
actors chose to ignore the huge challenges that evolved in
the course of the project. For example, before 1971, British
and American experts had warned that Nigeria was not ripe
for such a massive project as the ASP (Matusevich, 2003).
Support infrastructures were absent. The cost of the
technology being considered for the project was too high
for an incipient economy. Knowledge and skill gaps were
significant. In addition, the consumption rate of steel in the
whole of Africa was 8 kg per person, far below the
consumption rate in developed countries at the time
(300 kg per person). These issues were ignored. Rather
ASP’s stakeholders grew incredibly impatient (Oyeyinka
and Adeloye, 1988). They refused to pay attention to the
complexity underlying the construction of an integrated
steel plant. Before feasibility studies were completed,
media reports suggest the Nigerian public wanted an
immediate commencement of the plant’s operations – even
before authorities determined the volume and quality of
Nigeria’s iron ore deposits and the consumption rate
required to run the plant (Matusevich, 2003). While public
agitation continued, all actions involving the project were
only in the hands of political actors and bureaucrats.
The legislative framework for the project and the
commissioning of the first team of technocrats to oversee
the project did not happen until August 1971 – i.e., after six
years of political (over) sensitization. By the time the
technocrats came on board, they have had to cope with the
politics and pressure from the public. As a result, their
primary assignment was no longer straightforward. Neither
the project team at this stage nor the political leaders or the
sensitized public planned for the major misalignment that
the project development processes have encountered. They
had no foreknowledge regarding the outcome of the
situation either. Oyeyinka and Adeloye (1988) added also
that, throughout the gestation period, which was unusually
short, the project cost has soared. Globally, cost/ton of
install plant capacity escalated from 350 USD/ton in 1965
to 1700 USD in 1980, and the escalations continued
afterward. In Ajaokuta’s case, the project started at
6000 USD/ton in 1976, and the escalations continued in
chains until the project was commissioned uncompleted in
1985 – please note: costs of support infrastructure were
included in the cost of the ASP’s, where as others may not
have included such costs. One important factor in this was
that the pre-arranged finance condition did not consider the
chaotic variability that went with how the project situation
later emerged. As a result, funding became a problem.
Foreign debts rose. Despite this, Nigerian authorities did
not look back. All steel plant projects that were started at
the same time as Nigeria terminated their ambitions,
however, Nigeria chose to press on (see Oyeyinka and
Adeloye, 1988).
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2.6 Episodic issues around ASP’s success
Due to stakeholders’ impatience, ASP’s gestation only
lasted a couple of years. Other than the nation’s
enthusiastic energy, the experience of government’s local
representatives (the technocrats) regarding greenfield
plants was unverified, if at all any. They could not control
preexisting issues either. Another problem was that the
term of reference of the team was broad. It included: to
carry out a feasibility study on the proposed steel project,
conduct geological surveys to determine the volume and
quality of the iron-ore and coal deposits in Nigeria and to
repeat the same task on Nigeria’s other mineral deposits
such as dolomite, coal, and limestone. They have had to
deliver these within few weeks, despite the urgent
expectations from them on ASP (see Oyeyinka and
Adeloye, 1988).
The team chose a consultancy firm from Russia, V/0
Tiajpromexport, for the exploratory studies of the steel
plant. A project management firm from Germany was
selected also. While the geological investigations were
going on, the team sent several thousands of Nigerians to
different institutions internationally and locally to acquire
skills in different roles regarding how to operate and
manage the plant. By the time the training was completed,
exploratory studies were still ongoing. Apparently, the
training received by the workforce was not focused on the
actual content of findings from the exploratory studies as
could become useful in the construction and operation of
the ASP. In addition, when the results from the studies
were out, additional major problems became evident.
2.6.1 Communication and communication disconnect
As Matusevich (2003) reported, project documents such as
the reports of the exploratory studies and the project
designs, both in several volumes, were made in Russian.
They were to be interpreted (not reproduced) into English,
Nigeria’s lingua franca. The cultural barrier in the
documentation was a significant problem; time and
resources were spent in domesticating the documents,
albeit without perfection.
2.6.2 Unscheduled change to project expectations
Matusevich (2003) also reported how ASP’s management
team was made aware of the quality of iron ore deposit in
Nigeria only after exploratory studies had been completed.
By this time, the construction phase of the ASP project was
already in full swing. Findings from the studies show
Nigeria’s iron-ore has only 38% ferrous content. This
became the turning point for the project as the initial design
was made for an ore with much higher ferrous content. As
a result, an unplanned major redesign became paramount.
A basic oxygen furnace approach was added to the original
blast furnace. At the time, the approach was the most
appropriate technology to process ore with less ferrous
content. Many more alternative technologies have evolved
thereafter, some of which have proven to be more efficient
than the basic oxygen furnace approach (see Manning and
Fruehan 2001). Nonetheless, the designed process is not
the only problem; the overarching issue was that the
recommended process requires coking coal. Local coal
deposit in Nigeria, estimated at over two billion metric tons
at the time, is unsuitable for the plant because it is rich in
Sulphur and Ash. As a result, it looked as though the ASP
dream was built on a potentiality that never was – the local
ore and coal, the two primary inputs of the plant, that failed
to meet the standard required to run the plant as planned
and designed. Oyeyinka and Adeloye’s (1988) reflection
on this is as though the original dream of ASP’s
stakeholders has been defeated. The stakeholders’ dream
was that of self-sufficiency: they wanted the plant to be a
true symbol of Nigeria’s independence and authority in the
comity of industrialised nations. The apparent defeat
emanated from the fact that appropriate coking coal for
the plant is not available locally and importing the required
volume leaves the project uneconomical and vulnerable to
external forces. The plant is able to achieve considerable
outcomes only when imported coal is mixed with 20 % of
local coal.
2.6.3 Disruptive change of plans
Given the raw material situation explained above, an
option was to consider a different technology for the
plant’s processes. Direct reduction method was adopted. In
place of coking coal, direct reduction requires natural gas,
an abundant resource locally, to fuel the production. A
drawback however, is that the method requires the iron ore
to have a high ferrous content of about 80% (Zervas et al.,
1996). It is uneconomical to deliver the same outcome (as
80 % ferrous content) from an iron ore grade of 38 %
ferrous content, the quality of ore that is available in
Nigeria. A positive angle to this is that the situation is
slightly better than having to import coking coal. None-
theless, while discussions were still ongoing on the
processing method to adopt for the ASP, a new plant by
way of direction reduction commenced elsewhere in
South-South Nigeria. Like ASP, the new project was also
a national priority. Persistent escalations to ASP’s condi-
tions and the several dimensions to its challenges raged on
too. While these ambitious aspirations were expanding,
Nigeria’s economy contracted. As a result, Nigeria’s
creditworthiness had to freeze, the outcome of which
became unfavorable to financing such megaprojects on
funds that were borrowed externally under inflexible
conditions.
2.6.4 Larger-than-life solutions
Two blast furnaces were included in ASP design. By 1987,
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only one has been completed. However, the equipment has
not been used commercially nearly 30 years on. Al-Amin
(2013) cited an authority of the ASP, who indicated that if
turned on, the blast furnace is designed to work
continuously for ten years. Local supply capacity of raw
materials is only a fraction of the rate of consumption
required to make this happen. If this required volume of
raw materials was to be made available, their exploitation
should have started several years before the plant
commenced its operations. Kamara et al. (2002) have
captured this phenomenon that bedevilled the ASP
accurately. The authors argued that clients’ requirements
are often soft and ambiguous: clients’ actual needs are
often not differentiable from mere insatiable wants. For an
incipient economy, an incremental change management
process could have delivered some outcomes that are more
desirable than failure or idleness (see Buckley and Casson,
2010).
2.6.5 Change versus established culture and traditions
The motivation for building a steel plant in Nigeria
stemmed from the prominence of traditional iron forging, a
culture that has lasted many centuries in pre-amalgamated
Nigeria (see Emeriewen and Kalilu, 2015; Killick, 2004).
Initiators of the ASP did not realize the significant nuances
between the traditional method and the ASP’s integrated
processes. One of such nuances is the use of limestone in
steel making processes. ASP requires 700 million tonnes
per annum, whereas traditional forging method does not
require limestone. Meanwhile, limestone was discovered
in Nigeria only when feasibility investigations and
production design of the ASP had advanced significantly.
Being a greenfield too, limestone mining and processing
for the plant was slow. As Matusevich (2003) reported, had
limestone production commenced several years prior,
commercial production at the ASP would still have
struggled to achieve its optimum production target when
the plant was commissioned in 1985. For a megaproject
like ASP, the plan to make the primary plant ready is as
important as bolstering throughput supply network. The
mutual exclusivity in these (i.e., the in-feed supply and
primary operations of the plant) is as important as building
stakeholders’ confidence through extant cultures within the
Nigerian steel industry.
2.6.6 Project leadership
Nigeria’s political leaders were made aware of the issues.
However, they would rather remain positive and hope the
project succeeds than disappoint the masses who were
already connected to the project ecstatically. ASP con-
tinued regardless. In stern expectation, three in-land rolling
mills, which were expected to receive products from the
steel plant, were commissioned and completed much ahead
of the ASP. Similar support infrastructure by the private
sectors also suffered the same fate: They have remained
idle for nearly three decades now waiting for the sleeping
giant in ASP to wake up someday. An important lesson
from this is that leadership and situational optimism are not
entirely synonymous (see Beazley, 2009). Nigeria’s
political leaders needed to keep faith with the enthusiastic
energy of the populace, whereas they lacked the tool to
build the needed solutions from the inside-out and show an
authoritative class of their own rather than seeking
independence on the back of borrowed funds, borrowed
knowledge and support infrastructure that never existed.
In summary, 30 years on, ASP project has remained in
the national discourse. The project is neither a complete
failure nor a considerable success. Rather it is more of a
story of philosophical symbolism. Thinkers consider its
episodic attributes as a platform to seek education, perhaps
as how not to undertake a megaproject. Others, especially
local stakeholders, see it as a story of unwavering hope and
optimism: that, one day, the sleeping giant in ASP will rise
again. Yet the fundamental issues have remained
unchanged. That is, the plan to achieve greater goals
cannot be more important than giving a commitment to
planning. It is also important to learn to separate politics
from projects, not the least the need to evaluate project
ambitions objectively (see Love et al., 2015). It was
enough troubles that commitments were given to the
project while exploratory investigations on crucial raw
materials were not yet concluded. When Nigeria’s
economy and the Nigerian people were ready for the
ASP, the technology and the skills to drive the project were
not available. After an impatient wait, the preliminary
project report suggested a necessity for some more careful
considerations on operational issues. However, because of
cultural difference between the producers of the report and
the local stakeholders, some salient issues in the report
were ignored.
As indicated earlier, the exploratory reports and the
preliminary designs were documented in several volumes,
in Russian, and were too complex for the local audience. In
addition, when the rolling mills were ready, the steel plants
were not. When the steel plants were ready for partial
operation, the ingots were not. When there was a
considerable quantity of raw materials to commence
production, project costs have escalated and Nigeria’s
economy has become weaker. By 1985, only a bar mill and
a wire rod mill were completed and commissioned.
Although, work has continued thereafter, however it had
meant the plant recorded only about 28 percent success,
despite 1400 % cost overrun, when it was commissioned
(Matusevich, 2003). By the time work stopped perma-
nently on the plant, on paper, only six of the 482 items in
the ASP contract were not delivered. Nonetheless, the
outstanding items are vitally crucial. These include
extensive work on the blast furnace and gas supply to
the turbo-power generators. In addition, the cost of
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infrastructural support for the plant was also nearly
doubled, although the overall success was estimated at
38 %. Some of the reported success now requires a major
overhaul, having become dilapidated because of poor
maintenance and lack of use. The Ajaokuta steel plant has
been in minimal operation since its commissioning. Poor
funding, resourcing and management issues have affected
operations. Attempts to turn around the fortunes of the
plant through privatization have been unsuccessful.
Despite these, the steel plant remains a national asset,
exhuming lessons learnt by a nation aspiring to develop,
with the hope that the ‘idle lion’ in the Ajaokuta Steel plant
will rise again to fulfill its promises.
3 Insights: Analyzing the outcomes of the
ASP using theories of projects and
organizations
There are two dimensions to organizational factors that
influence a project’s outturn situation. One dimension
relates to organizations that play roles in project evolution;
the other is how projects themselves are organized (Smith
and Lewis, 2011; Hu et al., 2012). The two must interact
seamlessly. For example, a dysfunctional project-based
organization is unlikely to deliver a successful project (see
Hobday, 2000; Turner, 2008). Packendorff (1995) suggests
there is a linear relationship between project success and
the constituents of the project’s systems such as project
governance and resource inputs. Olaniran et al. (2017)
argue that such a linear relationship is only partially true
for traditional projects. Megaprojects are an exception.
Baccarini (1996) explains how complexity often triggers
random behaviors in constituent elements of megaprojects
such that project outcomes are seldom predicted by inter-
dependencies between them.
Outcomes of megaprojects can be explained using
theories relating to organizations behaviors and project
organization. This is because, according to Lundin and
Soderholm (1995), projects are temporary organizations;
their structures and culture facilitate how stakeholders
make things happen. An interesting part of this is how
intrinsic and extrinsic factors interrelate to define the
behavioral theories that underline how the different players
facilitate project outcomes. Four of such theoretical
perspectives are discussed below, aimed at explaining
lessons from the ASP story.
3.1 Socrates’ Generic Management and Leadership Theory
Shafritz et al. (2015) report a generic management theory
that dates back to Socrates’ time (469 – 399 B.C.E). The
theory considers projects as though providing leadership in
project environments can be dissociated from the skill-sets
that are available within project’s internal system. Based
around a story on the appointment of a war general that
was to lead the Athenian army, Shafritz and his team
documented the accounts of Xenophon (1869) regarding a
story that was credited to Socrates. In place of a trained and
experienced soldier, authorities have appointed a chorus
manager who had neither fought in a war nor possessed a
significant leadership experience in the army. Against
vehement objection to the choice, Socrates had argued that
the appointed chorus manager was the better option
because the chorus manager had led a chorus team
successfully. Socrates’ opinion was that the chorus
manager would not have succeeded if he was not able to
identify the best in his team and that he succeeded because
he had emulated and provided the best in his chorus team
with admirable leadership. Another outstanding strength
identified by Socrates was the chorus manager’s ability to
raise money and in managing the resources that were
available to him judiciously. To Socrates, a man who leads
a family is as good as a war general. However, the reality of
an army general’s competence is not in leading a train of
the army to a war, rather whether a war general will remain
standing both in courage and strategy when real weapons
of war announce their presence in a fierce battle.
Project management theorists have interpreted Socrates’
view as though leadership skill is dissociable from cognate
experience and an adept knowledge of the leaders in the
technical area for which leadership is to be provided
(Cleland, 1995; Rausch et al., 2005; Shafritz et al., 2015).
In addition, another core principle of this theory is that
resourcing and resource management make the leader a
king. This is also corroborated by Walker (1995) and Boyd
and Chinyio (2006) as though the most vital instrument of
success is a leader’s ability to make resources available to
the team, to select and learn from the best around, and to
drive results the way he best knows. This simplistic view
of leadership is one of the most noticeable debacles of the
ASP. As stated earlier, the initiators of the project have had
no understanding of the engineering and social complexity
of having a steel plant at the time the project started. They
were merely enthused by the opportunity to identify with
the people’s interest – mainly the desire to grow the
Nigerian economy into a superpower status from start as a
sovereign nation. They have had no experience of major
industrial projects. Interestingly, they were undeterred by
opinions that were contrary to their views, and showed
little or no understanding of critical issues. In addition,
they lacked the patience to exercise due diligence.
Planning was poor; as a result, the entire project became
vulnerable to unforeseen and poorly mitigated risks.
This lesson is not peculiar to Nigeria’s ASP project
alone. Several authors within the construction project
management field have often described the client as the
ultimate, the king; the only party whose opinion and
satisfaction matters (see Ahmed and Kangari, 1995;
Walker, 1995; Boyd and Chinyio, 2006; Isa et al., 2010).
In Flyvbjerg et al.’s (2013) view, client’s opinions are
sacrosanct: Opinions at variance are either deceptive or
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delusional. Love et al. (2015) have provided an idealist
view. They suggest variabilities are a constant feature of
complex projects and that such projects deserve holistic
consideration of issues such as clear integration between
leadership and project systems. Moreover, substantial
evidence had emerged from extant studies in support of
the view that projects are not likely to survive unless
clients, away from political undertones and pre-project
symbolisms [unrealistic expectations], are able to truly
own and drive some clear opinions about their expecta-
tions, and are able to integrate well with the project team
(see Kometa et al., 1995). As articulated by Bolden et al.
(2003), several projects and/or organizational leadership
theories also support this view (examples include Tannen-
baum and Schmidt’s continuum model, 1958; Fiedler’s
contingency model, 1967; Hersey and Blanchard’s model,
1977).
3.2 McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y
McGregor (1960) postulated Theory X and Theory Y
which reflects the assumptions of a leader about the led.
Theory X assumes the led has a tendency to undermine the
leader’s ambition. Thus, the led needed to be coerced,
controlled and threatened with punishment. Theory Y, on
the other hand, assumes the led seeks responsibility and is
self-led in achieving set objectives, only by utilizing a
portion of their potentials in the form of imagination,
ingenuity, and creativity. An overarching implication of
McGregor’s postulation in project organization theory is
that complex issues in major and mega projects are not
often solved by client’s coercive posture. Rather openness,
integration and co-operative approaches to risk-sharing
often motivate the led to support the leader’s ambition with
extraordinary commitment (see Grudinschi et al., 2014;
Mohammad-Hasanzadeh et al., 2014; Naoum and Egbu,
2015; Grandia, 2016; Jelodar et al., 2016; ).
In the case of the ASP, project initiators did not believe
they needed to lead from the front by providing
information that will make project implementation more
successful. They did not realize how out-of-control they
were having to deliver a greenfield project on the borrowed
fund, borrowed knowledge and a support infrastructure
that never existed. Their perspective on project success is
the input-goal approach. They have shown very limited
commitment to understanding how processes help deliver
results. In Beazley’s (2009) interpretation of this phenom-
enon, the situation is as though the initiators of ASP could
not draw a line between attributional and dispositional
optimism. Attributional optimism is a form of systematic
error made when actors seek to find reasons for their own
and others’ behaviors (Abramson et al., 1978). Disposi-
tional optimism is characterized by positive expectations
that influence motivated action (Carver and Scheier, 2014).
Political actors that engineered leadership on the ASP only
wanted to be seen as progressive. However, they are
disposed only to soothing advice. The truth is: A leader
that is keen to succeed should understand how to deal with
the bias in his or her optimism (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Flyvbjerg
et al., 2013). By transferring the most significant risks to
the project team – the risk to determine the raw materials,
investigate the quality of the inputs, to design the process
plant, train the workers, determine the output, the market,
the business philosophy and environment etcetera – ASP’s
initiators seemed to have lost their authority [including
financial control], which in reality they never had. Baloi
and Price (2003) have documented the vulnerability of
projects’ cost performance to external forces such as global
factors of cost variability, macroeconomic dynamics and
finance engineering issues. Theory X could have been
appropriate if ASP project team have educated the project
initiators about the negative sides to the project initiators’
intentions. However, strategic optimism theory was more
applicable in the way the ASP turned out. Strategic
optimism theorists argue strategic optimists are often keen
to set high expectations and hope for good outcomes,
whereas they often fail to reflect on present issues and
shape their confidence about the future experientially
(Spencer and Norem, 1996; Norem, 2001). This is true
about the ASP team because the team presented them-
selves as though they have all the answers in the kitty. The
gap between their optimism and project’s actual reality is
ASP’s margin of failure.
3.3 Systems Theory
Hylighen and Joslyn (1995) defined systems theory as an
abstract organization of phenomena, triggered by the
interdependencies between complex constituent entities.
Packendorff (1995) explained the philosophical implica-
tions of system theory to the planning and management of
construction projects as though the way to analyze
performance phenomena of megaprojects is “to consider
the project as a whole, constructed from parts [governance,
environment, culture, teams, supply chain, leadership,
motivation, society, processes, international impacts], and
the interdependencies between them ..//… the better the
structure of the parts, the better the whole system.” For
example, it is misleading to simply conclude an opinion on
outturn situations of the ASP by merely isolating the
imperfections of an individual actor in the project. Even
leadership, taken simply as it sounds, as an entity playing a
role in the failure or success of the ASP, is not entirely
simplistic. Nigeria’s political leadership changed hands
severally between the initiation and the commissioning of
the ASP; none existed because of the ASP, and the
motivation that each regime has had for the project varied
considerably. In addition, all the regimes evolved through
nefarious military actions or infantile democratic processes
that lasted only a short time. The implication of this
complexity is that project leadership is not exactly a
flawless continuum. In the case of ASP, its initiation and
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governance were shaped by the frictions of multifarious
political situations, fuelled by pressure points from multi-
ple dimensions, including stakeholders’ impatience, inter-
national politics that was less than ideal, a local politics
that changed shape frequently, project team’s inexperience
and an uncertain socio-environment. These are also to
triggers variabilities to stage expectations and planned
management processes.
Nonetheless, these are all snapshots of leadership issues,
a single element of the ASP. Apparently, outcomes could
have remained the same if the project leadership situation
was different. Oyeyinka and Adeloye (1988) reported that
13 steel plants that started around the same time as the ASP
were abandoned. They have all had different leadership
models. In ASP’s case, potentials of the project were kept
alive and could still be revisited. Nonetheless, the two
theories above on leadership and leadership behavior have
helped explain what could have been done to improve
future outcome – for example, that the project leaders
should understand the psychology of the led, and that the
relationship between the leader and the led should be
integrative. These are crucial. However, the theories cannot
whisk the problems away. It is only appropriate that the
entire project organization system by looked into holi-
stically. Project organizations have been likened to
temporary organizations, motivated by a need to perform
specific actions as though the accuracy of such actions
determines the success of a project, largely in the form or a
cause-effect relationship (Lundin and Soderholm, 1995).
Systems thinking theorists have focused on the inter-
dependencies between cause and effect by diagnosing
project performance issues using holistic lenses rather than
focusing on isolated observations. In particular, finite
attributes of projects – uniqueness, costs, duration, teams
and transition – are often conditioned by peculiarities
[knowledge depth, clarity of owner’s expectation], systems
[due diligence in managing elements of a project and the
rationalities underlying them], relationships [managing
interdependencies between sub-systems] and perspectives
[fine-tunning optimism with realism] (Cabrera et al.,
2008).
In essence, overruns did not just happen because the
planners were corrupt and deceptive (Matusevich, 2003;
Flyvbjerg et al., 2013). Problems arose partly because of
inflexibility in the finance arrangement and because the
local economy became weak suddenly as a commitment to
the project climaxed. Nevertheless, in the last three
decades, successive governments have taken several
steps – including privatisation, refinancing and sustained
annual investments running to billions of dollars. Accord-
ing to media reports, Nigeria spends an estimated $4.5
billion annually to import steel. Less than half of this is
required to complete the plant. Yet the outturn situation has
remained unchanged. Apparently, the situation of the ASP
evolved into a chaos [a lack of ability of a disturbed system
to regain stability when inhibitors are withdrawn]. How
this happened needs to be understood. This is important
because it is common that megaprojects are not delivered
to planned costs and schedule, it is only uncommon that
stubborn problems remained defiant for decades, espe-
cially in such a symbolic project as the ASP.
3.4 Chaos Theory
Reichl (2004) defined ‘Chaos’ as a state of randomness,
disorderliness, confusion or uncertainty. Chaos theorists
have explained why certain natural systems seldom obey
the traditional logic of science e.g., why relationships
between causes and effects are nonlinear, particularly in
complex projects in which complex organizations are
involved (Checkland, 1999; De Meyer et al., 2002;
Geraldi, 2009). Against conventional theoretical expecta-
tions regarding project success, chaos theory clarifies why
project success is not fully explained by the strength of
generic indicators such as accuracy of planning, control,
technology, communication, leadership and resourcing
(see Cooke-Davies et al., 2011). For example, as Olaniran
et al. (2015) argued, traditional project management
theorists are often quick to use deterministic perspectives
in analyzing what, how, when, and why a project fails.
Such theorists often declare ‘failure’ when a project
overran its pre-contract budget or completion schedule or
the satisfaction of every possible stakeholder group
(Flyvberg et al., 2002; Smith and Love, 2004; Ogunlana,
2010; Priemus, 2010). The overarching uniqueness of
chaos theory is that it explains why project outturns are not
entirely predictable by observable finite parameters; the
implications of uncertainty being the language of complex-
ity in projects, as though even in a platitude of the knowns,
there are many unknowns (Pich et al., 2002).
There are four attributes of a chaotic situation:
3.4.1 Sensitive interdependencies
These explain why small changes in inter-connected
parameters are able to trigger significant and unpredictable
consequences in a project system. Kellert (1994) refers to
this as an unstable behavior within a system in which the
system can no longer remain insensitive to small changes
in the system’s initial conditions. In the case of ASP, some
of the isolated issues which might be ignoble in other
countries and others projects, have created significant
outcomes as ASP progressed. Whether they are considered
individually or as a combined force, they would not have
made much difference Examples of these include having to
speed up exploratory processes, the preparation of project
documents in Russian for an English audience, the manner
in which erratic macroeconomic variations eclipsed the
project, the political instabilities, and the superficial
workforce training programs were all significant issues.
Each of them was surmountable when they occurred.
However, they triggered outcomes that further complicated
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ASP’s ultimate success. For example, additional time was
needed to convert project documents from Russian to
English, albeit with imperfections. While this was
ongoing, the international finance scene moved, resulting
in pressures on the local economy and ASP’s finance
arrangement. Findings from the exploratory studies had
also meant that alternative decisions must be taken
regarding the plant’s design and processing options.
These would not have progressed if the initiators of the
second steel plant – the Aladja Steel Plant, which uses
direct reduction, were not convinced of the bounded
rationality that Nigeria’s economy could sustain the two
projects concurrently. However, that decision had added
more burden to the already overly complex situation of the
ASP. Aladja Plant was completed, but it never delivered as
much promise as the ASP.
3.4.2 Feedback loop
This is where actions taken to ameliorate a chaotic
situation further disintegrate orderliness within a system
(Reigeluth, 2004). Murphy (1996) has reported a sig-
nificant difference between linear and nonlinear systems in
terms of feedback loop, in that linear systems achieve
stability by leveraging negative feedback to effect correc-
tions and discourage further deviation from stability. In
contrast, chaotic systems evolve by means of positive
feedback, in that every dimension is taken to simplify
complexity and push for positive outturn situation often
provide the material rationale for new formulations. This
has meant some outcome(s) may be farther dispersed from
the original goal of a project. Thus the implication of
positive feedback, and one of the few routes to success in
complex projects, is that new solution formulations must
amplify deviations, destabilize certainty and generate new
dimensions to issues. For example, Aladja Plant was a
positive feedback to ASP’s issues, and so were the
numerous attempts made to make ASP viable regardless,
including the addition of a natural gas system to ASP’s
hydro-power system. Although, a positive addition, the
solution became unviable as vandalism of gas pipelines
became a prominent issue in a particular part of Nigeria.
Once broken, gas pipelines have had to be fixed repeatedly,
communities needed to be cleaned, media upheavals
needed to be addressed, other installations needed to be
checked and the entire system must be re-secured.
Interruptions caused by the vandalism also brought
avoidable stoppages to work.
3.4.3 Bifurcation
This represents flashpoints of change where a system’s
character and structure are disrupted, resulting in conti-
nuous radical transformations (Sellnow et al., 2002).
According to Schuldberg (2011), this is the point a project
system transforms from regular change embodiment to a
chaotic system. In the case of the ASP, this is a point when
achieving immediate and target success became over-
whelmed by situational changes. Some of these are
summarized below:
(1) The backward integration program:
Following multiple positive feedback on the initial
design of the ASP, political authorities at the time decided
to control the attendant new formulations by introducing
negative feedback measures (see the reports of Williams,
1964; Oyeyinka and Adeloye, 1988; Matusevich, 2003).
According to these authors, ASP was then reprogrammed
for backward integration. This means some essential
components of the steel plant will be completed first,
commercial production will commence, and proceeds
raised from the production will be used to finance the
rest of the project. There are two sides to how this affected
the ASP. First, megaprojects seldom break even immedi-
ately (see Flyvbjerg, 2007). The gap between reintegration
of proceeds and cessation of existing funding arrangement
became a flashpoint. Stakeholders have had to reset their
perspectives to the economic rationality of the project to
this situation. Second, reseting or reducing project scope in
the middle of implementing a megaproject may not
translate into immediate performance improvements. In
the case of the ASP, coordination became impossible.
Clients only considered their overall spending and not the
impact of new formulations. On the others hand,
contractors could not redirect their investments in new
formulation into the reset scope either.
(2) Debts and pervasive corruption:
For megaprojects, flexible funding arrangements are not
negotiable. ASP cost plan blew out its limits fairly quickly.
For an incipient economy with the public institution in a
molten state, wastes and corruption became persistent
phenomena. Debts rose, the economy weakened but ASP’s
scope and the sidekicks [wastes and corruption] continued
to increase. Matusevich (2003) explained why these, and
‘manufactured authoritarianism governments’ are the
cultural similarities between Nigeria and the old Soviet
Union that further put the ASP out of stakeholders’ control.
(3) Reality vs client’s expectation:
Matusevich (2003) also wrote about how Nigeria’s
commitment to the ASP waned as a result of poor
alignment between their expectation and certain realities at
the time. For example, in Nigeria, ASP was not just a
symbol of economic power and development, developing
the steel industry is the only key to true independence and
achieving prominence in the comity of global powers. In
particular, Nigerian leaders were fixated on their perceived
correlation between the development of the steel industry
and Nigeria’s true economic freedom and prosperity. In
reality, however, no nation becomes truly independent by
relying on one single industry. Soon after oil exploration
started, and the better understanding of the truth regarding
the perceived correlation between steel production and
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economic growth, Nigerian authorities re-adjusted their
expectations. The focus shifted to oil and gas, while steel
and coal were no longer a priority.
(4) Government stability and politics of megaprojects:
ASP is a social project. It was initiated and implemented
by a government that only lasted for few years. Between
1958 and 1971 when ASP was initiated and started
respectively, Nigeria recorded five leadership regimes: One
foisted by Britain, one as an interim arrangement following
the independence, one constitutional republic, and two
military juntas. In addition, there was a three-year-long
civil war during this time (see Jorre, 1972). Between the
ASP’s commencement in 1971 and its commissioning in
1985, Nigeria was led by another five regimes, four of
which were military juntas deposing each other and the
only democratic regime at the time. Each of these
situations has meant different outcomes to the ASP. This
is because the leaders have had different focuses, and the
disruptions in government did aggravate the economy
against the project.
3.4.4 Attractor
This is the stable component of a system in continuous
state of disorder (see Robertson and Combs, 2014). An
attractor is also defined by Pryor and Bright (2007) as a
situation in which “a system self-organizes into coherence
and adapts to maintain, sustain or recreate order when
subject to change from either internal functioning or
external influence.” Although not much progress has been
recorded in the ASP following contractors’ demobilisation
from the site since the 1980s, the spirit of the ASP has
remained within Nigeria. The plant has had a scant
operation. Varying degree of success has been achieved.
The gap between the plant’s current state and revamping it
to full capacity is known (see Akeju, 2018). If the project is
to happen again, it is evident the mistakes will not have to
repeat themselves.
4 Conclusions and implications for future
research
ASP is symbolic to Nigeria and the developing world.
Lessons from the project’s history relate to extant work on
authentic leadership. Project owners and leaders should see
megaprojects as a platform for a collaborative relationship
rather than authoritarian rationality. In addition, mega-
projects are sufficiently unique. It is often possible to find
that leaders of megaprojects are under-trained for the
challenges that may evolve on the project. However, a
clear chain of expectation in managing leaders of
megaprojects is the depth of the leaders’ own knowledge
in the implementation processes of the proposed project
and their due diligence on planning. Secondly, positive
feedbacks in the form of new formulations in live projects
are not in the negative interest of a megaproject. They are a
part of the success story that cannot be dissociated from the
project. As noted earlier, controlling positive feedback
with negative feedback measures does aggravate project
performance. Flexibility in megaprojects should not be
treated like an avoidable disease, rather should be treated
like a phenomenon to live with, to control and manage its
consequences and allow for immediate intervention. The
experiences presented in this study shows a project may
exist without being an absolute success or failure. ASP did
not deliver its promised potential. It did not fail either: It is
a symbolic experience of an ambitious nation, a story of
hope and an accumulation of lessons that have been learnt
successfully about how not to fail. All construction stories
have had unique stories. However, they are rarely told.
Future studies in the area will reshape current under-
standing about project success and how this might help in
the management of future projects. In particular, extant
understanding about project organization will benefit if
future studies consider complexity as a key factor of
economic rationality in project success.
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